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INTRODUCTION
Voting five to four, the United States Supreme Court granted
proponents of free legal services for the poor a major victory in Brown
1
v. Legal Foundation of Washington.
The Court upheld the
2
constitutionality of Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”), a
funding mechanism which produces millions of dollars annually for
3
these legal services. IOLTA accounts consist of pooled, interestbearing deposits of client funds that, individually, are so nominal in
amount or are to be held for such a short period of time that they are
4
not capable of generating net interest for the client. The proceeds
of IOLTA accounts go to the state’s IOLTA program, which
5
distributes the money to non-profit legal service providers. Every
state, as well as the District of Columbia, uses IOLTA programs to
6
fund legal services for the poor.
The plaintiffs in Brown challenged Washington state’s IOLTA
program on the grounds that it allegedly violated the Fifth
7
Amendment Takings Clause. The Supreme Court rejected the
1. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
2. Id. at 1421.
3. See id. at 1412 (indicating that IOLTA-generated revenue exceeded $200
million in 2001).
4. See COMM’N ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS’ TRUST ACCOUNTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, WHAT
IS IOLTA? [hereinafter WHAT IS IOLTA?], at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices
/iolta/ioltback.html (last modified Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with the American
University Law Review) (explaining that if a client’s funds are capable of earning
interest for the client after any banking and administrative charges, an attorney may
not deposit those funds in an IOLTA account); see also David Luban, Taking Out the
Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 226-27
(2003) (noting that prior to the advent of IOLTA, interest that a client could not
collect defaulted to the bank); Kristi L. Darnell, Note, Pennies From Heaven—Why
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington Violates the U.S.
Constitution, 77 WASH. L. REV. 775, 778-80 (2002) (describing the mechanics of
IOLTA accounts).
5. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (noting that IOLTA programs distribute
their funds to not-for-profit organizations through a local grant process).
6. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1411; see also Darnell, supra note 4, at 778 (confirming
presence of IOLTA programs in all fifty states).
7. See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1415 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that IOLTA
programs take the interest earned on IOLTA accounts without providing just
compensation, thereby violating the Takings Clause). Although the plaintiffs’
complaint also alleged that Washington’s IOLTA program violated their First
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court declined to address the First Amendment
claim. Id.
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argument, explaining that even if the transfer of clients’ pooled
interest earnings to a legitimate state foundation constituted a taking,
the state did not owe the clients any just compensation because they
8
had suffered no net monetary loss. Each client’s individual funds
9
would not have earned that client net interest in the first place.
Justice Kennedy issued a dissent in which he cautioned that IOLTA
programs may constitute a “serious violation” of the First
10
Amendment.
He claimed that Washington’s IOLTA program
“grants to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced
11
support of certain viewpoints.”
Justice Kennedy cited two cases
concerning compelled financial support to suggest that IOLTA
programs may violate the First Amendment—Abood v. Detroit Board of
12
13
Education and Keller v. State Bar of California. In Abood and Keller, the
Court held that a union and a bar association, respectively, could use
mandatory dues only to fund activities germane to the purpose of the
14
organization.
It is unclear whether the Washington Legal
Foundation, the organization that spearheaded most of the litigation
against IOLTA programs, will pursue a new First Amendment claim

8. See id. at 1419-21 (measuring just compensation by the property owner’s
pecuniary loss rather than by the gain to the government). Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, dissented, stating that
interest accumulated on IOLTA accounts was the property of the client and that just
compensation should be measured by the fair market value of the interest, not the
net loss to the owner. See id. at 1422-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that
petitioners are due the “value of the property on the date it is appropriated,” rather
than the “interest petitioners would have earned had their funds been deposited in
non-IOLTA accounts”).
9. See id. (stating that Washington’s IOLTA rules require an attorney or Limited
Practice Officer (“LPO”) to deposit client funds in a non-IOLTA account if they are
capable of generating net interest for the client).
10. Id. at 1428 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11. See id. (positing that had the state not established an IOLTA program, “the
free market might have created various and diverse funds for pooling small interest
amounts” that a client could then use as he pleased).
12. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
13. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
14. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (stating that the union could not use required fees
to finance activities “unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative”);
Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14 (finding that the State Bar could use mandatory dues only for
activities related to “regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services”).
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against such programs. However, at least one Justice believes that a
16
First Amendment claim against IOLTA programs likely has merit.
This Comment argues that IOLTA programs do not violate the
First Amendment and challenges Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that
the same potential First Amendment violation exists in IOLTA as
exists in the Abood and Keller circumstances. Part I describes the
development and operation of IOLTA programs and examines their
significance in funding civil legal services for the needy. Part I also
reviews pre-Brown litigation concerning IOLTA. Part II discusses the
concept of compelled speech, reviewing three landmark cases
concerning compelled financial support: Abood, Keller, and Board of
17
Regents v. Southworth.
Part II then addresses two lower courts’
18
treatment of compelled speech claims against IOLTA in particular.
Part III analyzes the possible application of the First Amendment to
IOLTA programs under both intermediate and strict scrutiny
standards and concludes that courts should uphold IOLTA programs
under either analysis in the event of a challenge.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF IOLTA

A. The Development of IOLTA
Attorneys often need to hold client funds for various periods of
time. For instance, an attorney may hold a retainer fee from which
he will deduct costs, or he may hold a client’s settlement award in a
19
Rules of legal ethics prohibit an attorney from
trust account.
15. See Marcia Coyle, Battle Over IOLTA Could be Renewed: Using Funds for Indigent
Clients Might be Seen as “Compelled Speech”, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 31, 2003, at A5 (suggesting
that “a First Amendment claim against IOLTA programs would be long and
difficult”). But see Margaret Graham Tebo, Victory For IOLTA: Supreme Court Upholds
Funding Mechanism for Legal Aid, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Mar. 28, 2003 (“The First
Amendment issue is very much alive.”), available at Westlaw, 2 No. 12 ABAJEREP 2
(on file with the American University Law Review).
16. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1428 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (asserting that “[o]ne constitutional violation (the taking of property)
likely will lead to another (compelled speech)”). According to Justice Kennedy’s
dissenting argument, requiring clients to contribute interest to an organization that
funds legal services for the poor amounts to compelled speech because the clients
may not agree with that funding. Id.
17. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
18. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 978 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that Massachusetts’ IOLTA program did not violate freedom of speech or
association); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp.
2d 624, 633 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim
against the Texas state IOLTA program).
19. See James D. Anderson, The Future of IOLTA: Solutions to Fifth Amendment
Takings Challenges Against IOLTA Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 717, 721 (1999)
(citing types of funds that attorneys hold for clients in trust accounts, including
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commingling his own money with client funds.
Prior to 1980,
attorneys typically held their clients’ funds in non-interest bearing
accounts due to the fact that Congress did not permit federal banks
21
to pay interest on checking accounts. Often, attorneys pooled funds
of multiple clients into one account, as it was expensive to hold each
22
client’s funds in a separate account. Since these accounts did not
bear interest, banks benefited from free use of the clients’ funds
23
while they held them. In 1980, Congress approved the creation of
24
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (“NOW”) accounts, allowing
federally-insured banks to pay interest on deposits so long as the
25
interest went to charitable organizations.
Following the change in banking laws, states began to establish
26
IOLTA programs. States with mandatory IOLTA programs require
attorneys to deposit certain client funds in IOLTA accounts—
27
essentially, NOW accounts used for client deposits. The only funds
that an attorney may place in IOLTA accounts are those which are so
nominal in amount or will be held for such a short period of time
that the funds will not generate interest for the client net of banking
28
and administrative fees. If a client’s funds could earn the client
interest after banking and administrative fees, then his attorney must

settlement awards, fees advanced for future services, and funds to pay court fees).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (1989) (stating that “[a]
lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in
connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property”). But see
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1411 (2003) (noting that it is not
unethical for an attorney to combine several clients’ funds).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1978). See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
160-61 (1998) (pointing out that a lawyer typically held large client funds in an
interest bearing savings account because the interest earned on the deposit justified
the nuisance of not being able to write checks on the account).
22. WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4.
23. See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1411 (stating that the value of the interest earned on
clients’ funds used to default to the bank, but that under IOLTA programs, this
money now goes to charitable legal service providers).
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (authorizing owners of deposits to make
withdrawals in order to transfer the interest to charitable entities).
25. See id. § 1832(a)(2) (stating that NOW accounts are permitted for “funds in
which the entire beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals or by an
organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable,
educational, political, or other similar purposes and which is not operated for
profit”). See generally Anderson, supra note 19, at 720-22 (describing Congress’s
authorization of NOW accounts and a related IRS revenue ruling).
26. See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1411 (noting that Florida established the first IOLTA
program in 1981, only one year after congressional approval of NOW accounts); see
also FLA. BAR R. 5-1.1 (2002 Supp.) (adopting IOLTA program by rule approved by
highest state court).
27. See infra note 38 (listing the states that currently have mandatory IOLTA
programs).
28. WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4.
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29

place the funds in a non-IOLTA account. Therefore, because the
interest earned on IOLTA accounts could not have been earned on
30
the clients’ individual funds, the client suffers no monetary loss.
Attorneys are responsible for evaluating whether a client’s funds
31
should be held in an IOLTA account.
Consistent with the specific state’s law, banks submit the interest
earned on IOLTA accounts to the state IOLTA organization, which
32
then distributes the funds to charitable legal service providers.
Thus, banks no longer benefit from free use of non-interest bearing
33
accounts. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) does not
tax interest on IOLTA accounts so long as the client does not control
whether his attorney places his funds in an IOLTA account or which
34
IOLTA recipients receive the interest on his funds.
Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have established
35
IOLTA programs. A state may create an IOLTA program either by
36
statute through its legislature or by state supreme court order.
29. Id.
30. See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1421 (holding that a client’s pecuniary loss from
IOLTA programs is zero).
31. See, e.g., MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FAQ—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at
http://www.mlsc.org/faq.htm#3 (last modified Oct. 30, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (estimating that it costs fifty dollars in
administrative costs to maintain an individual interest bearing account for a client).
Therefore, attorneys in Maryland must assess whether their client’s funds will be held
long enough to generate more than fifty dollars in interest. Id. A client’s principal
of $10,000 will take approximately ninety-two days to form fifty dollars in interest; a
$30,000 principal will take approximately thirty days to earn fifty dollars in interest; a
$100,000 principal will take approximately nine days to earn fifty dollars in interest.
Id. Depending on a particular state’s IOLTA rule, an attorney may be liable to the
client for interest generated on funds that an attorney mistakenly deposits in an
IOLTA account. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
32. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (stating that the net interest collected on
IOLTA accounts, after paying administrative bank fees, is remitted to the state
IOLTA program). State foundations are operated by volunteers and distribute the
funds through local grants to non-profit organizations that provide legal services for
the needy. Id.
33. See Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1412 (explaining that IOLTA programs transfer the
interest earned on IOLTA accounts to charitable legal service providers); see also Erin
E. Heuer Lantzer, IOLTA Lost the Battle but Has Not Lost the War, 33 IND. L. REV. 1015,
1016-17 (2000) (providing a numerical example to illustrate the process by which
interest on a client’s funds is channeled to legal service providers).
34. See Rev. Rul. 87-2 1987-1 C.B. 18 (stating that interest earned on IOLTA
accounts is not includible in the gross income of either the client or the attorney); see
also Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d 624,
628-29 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (discussing the mechanics of the IOLTA program in
Texas).
35. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1411.
36. COMM’N ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS’ TRUST ACCOUNTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, CURRENT
STATUS OF IOLTA PROGRAMS [hereinafter CURRENT STATUS OF IOLTA PROGRAMS], at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltus.html (last modified May 9, 2003)
(on file with the American University Law Review). Five states created their IOLTA
program through their legislature. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6211(a) (West
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There are three types of IOLTA programs: mandatory, opt-out, and
37
voluntary. Twenty-seven states have mandatory IOLTA programs, in
which lawyers within the program’s jurisdiction are required to
38
participate.
An additional twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia have opt-out programs, in which attorneys must opt-out if
39
they wish not to participate. Two states and the Virgin Islands have
voluntary IOLTA programs, in which an attorney may choose
40
whether to deposit client funds in an IOLTA account.
Because
mandatory IOLTA programs compel attorneys to deposit certain
client funds in IOLTA accounts, opponents of IOLTA have targeted
41
mandatory programs in their legal challenges.
1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-81c (Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. §
10-303 (2000); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (McKinney Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4705.09(A)(1) (Anderson 2000). The rest of the states created IOLTA programs
through state supreme court order. See ALA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(g) (1996);
ALASKA RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2001); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 44(c)(2) (2002); ARK.
RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d)(2) (2002); COLO. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(e)
(2002); DEL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(h) (2002); D.C. RULES OF COURT, App. B(a)
(2002); FLA. BAR R. 5-1.1 (2002 Supp.); GA. BAR R. 1.15(II) (2002); HAW. SUP. CT. R.
11 (2002); IDAHO RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002); IND. RULES PROF. CONDUCT
1.15(d) (2000); IOWA CODE PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (rev. ed. 2002); KAN.
RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d)(3) (2002); KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130, RULES PROF. CONDUCT
1.15 (2002); LA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (West Supp. 2003); ME. CODE PROF.
RESPONSIBILITY 3.6(e)(4) (2002); MASS. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15 (2002); MICH.
RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002); MINN. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002);
MISS. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002); MO. SUP. CT. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 41.15 (2002); MONT. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.18(b) (2002); NEB. CODE PROF.
RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (2000); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 217 (2000); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50
(2002); N.J. RULES GEN. APPLICATION 1:28A-2 (2003); N.M. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 16115(D) (2002 Supp.); N.C. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15-4 (2001); N.D. RULES PROF.
CONDUCT 1.15(d)(1) (2002); OKLA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002); ORE. CODE
PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(D)(2) (2002); PA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d)
(2002); R.I. RULES PROF. CONDUCT, Art. V, 1.15(d) (2001); S.C. APP. CT. RULES 412
(1990); S.D. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(e) (1995); TENN. SUP. CT. RULE 8, CODE
PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR9-102(C)(2) (2002); TEX. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.14 (2002);
UTAH RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15 (2002); VT. RULE, CODE PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR 9103 (2002); VA. SUP. CT. RULES, pt. 6, § II, RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.14 (2002); W. VA.
RULES PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.15 (2002); WYO. RULES
PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(d) (2002).
37. CURRENT STATUS OF IOLTA PROGRAMS, supra note 36.
38. See id. (listing that the following states have mandatory IOLTA programs:
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
39. See id. (stating that the District of Columbia and the following states have optout IOLTA programs: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming).
40. See id. (indicating that Oklahoma and South Dakota have voluntary IOLTA
programs).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003) (challenging
the mandatory IOLTA program in Washington state); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156 (1998) (examining the constitutionality of Texas’s mandatory IOLTA
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B. The Significance of IOLTA
The largest source of funding for civil legal services for the poor is
the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), created by Congress in
42
1974. Congress charged the LSC with providing “equal access to the
system of justice in our Nation for individuals who seek redress of
grievances” by making available high quality legal services to those
43
that are unable to afford them.
Since its inception, the LSC has faced attacks from those suspicious
44
of the activities it funds. For instance, in the 1980s the Reagan
administration proposed to cut LSC funding entirely in several
45
budget requests. Congress, in response, cut LSC funding by twenty-

program); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993)
(assessing claims against Massachusetts’s mandatory IOLTA program).
42. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)). See generally Alan W.
Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1221-22 (2002) (detailing how the increased
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) funding during the late 1970s and early 1980s
made possible the expansion of civil legal service programs throughout the United
States). In 2001, the LSC’s annual budget was approximately $330 million. Id.
43. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 (declaring that the provision of
free legal services for the poor serves the ends of justice, improves opportunities for
low-income persons, and reaffirms faith in the rule of law). See LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1 (2000) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT], available at http://www.lsc.gov/
pressr/EXSUM.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
44. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, at
http://www.nlada.org/About/About_HistoryCivil (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) (on file
with the American University Law Review) (explaining that the expansion of LSC was
met with fear that providing legal services to the poor would adversely affect the
status quo); Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1089, 1095-99 (2003) (stating that politicians such as then-Governor
Ronald Reagan and President Richard Nixon were angered by the success of legal
service attorneys during the early 1970s in protecting the poor’s civil rights and
property rights and expanding benefits for women, children, immigrants, the
elderly, and the disabled). Vice President Spiro Agnew referred to legal service
attorneys as “ideological vigilantes.” Id. at 1094. When Congress passed the Legal
Services Corporation Act, the program provided that law reform would not be a goal
of the program. Id. at 1095. Deborah M. Weissman, Law As Largess: Shifting
Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 755-56 (2002) (discussing
opposition to the provision of legal services for the poor that existed prior to the
formation of the LSC and continued after the LSC was established). Some
individuals and groups questioned the political and ideological motivations of legal
service providers and disliked legal service providers’ attempts to reallocate rights of
the wealthy and poor. Id.
45. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 44 (asserting that President
Reagan’s hostility towards the LSC was due, in part, to his belief that government
should limit its involvement in social programs); see also William P. Quigley, Legal
Services: The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 241, 255-57 (1998) (noting that President Reagan sought to replace the LSC
with a local system of legal aid and that the administration created an LSC board that
was hostile to its own agency).
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46

five percent in fiscal year 1982. In 1995, congressional leaders led
47
The Senate rejected
another effort to eliminate the LSC.
48
elimination of the LSC, but Congress imposed a new set of
restrictions that significantly limited the types of cases LSC-funded
49
entities could undertake and the clients they could represent. For
instance, since 1996, LSC-funded organizations may not represent
clients in redistricting matters or in abortion-related litigation, nor
may they represent certain classes of aliens (including many who are
legal), persons who are incarcerated, or persons charged with drug
50
crimes in public housing evictions. Recipients of LSC funds also
may not participate in any class action suits, nor may they challenge
51
welfare reform. Further, Congress’s 1996 restraints provided that
recipients of LSC funds could not use non-LSC funds to engage in
52
any activities for which LSC funds were prohibited. These restraints
46. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 44 (stating that funding
was cut from $321 million in fiscal year 1981 to $241 million in fiscal year 1982,
forcing many programs to close); see also Margot Hornblower, Legal Services Reprieve
Voted; Legal Services Corp. Reprieved by House; House Ignores Veto Threat, WASH. POST, June
19, 1981, at A1 (discussing the vote by the House to continue the existence of the
LSC with a substantially reduced budget in spite of President Reagan’s desire to
abolish the program).
47. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 44 (noting that the House
proposed a budget in which LSC funding would be cut by one third during the 1996
fiscal year, by two thirds the next year, and entirely the following year).
48. See Mauricio Vivero, From “Renegade” Agency To Institution of Justice: The
Transformation of Legal Services Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1330-31 (2002)
(stating that the Senate vote was 60-39 in favor of retaining the LSC and imposing
new restrictions on the agency).
49. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1353-57 (1996) (listing numerous restrictions
placed upon the funds granted to the LSC, including engaging in lobbying;
representing clients in class actions; and participating in cases concerning welfare
reform); see also Nicole B. Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting
Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 566-67 (2000) (noting that
the LSC restrictions were a compromise between members of Congress desiring
continued support of the LSC and those members who wished the complete
dissolution of the corporation); Luban, supra note 4, at 222 (referring to the LSC
restrictions as “silencing doctrines”).
50. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(11), (14), (15), (17).
51. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504;
see also Gordon J. Beggs, Defend the Rights of the Poor, 37 CATH. LAW. 1, 2 (1996)
(stating that the restrictions imposed upon the LSC have rendered the poor as the
only class of citizens in this country unable to bring class action lawsuits); Alan W.
Houseman, Restrictions By Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2187, 2201 (1999) (emphasizing that the 1996 restrictions on class actions, welfare
reform, and attorney’s fees are absolute and have no exceptions); Weissman, supra
note 44, at 764-65 (noting that welfare-related restrictions were particularly
contentious and that accusations were made that LSC money was used to
“undermine local government programs relating to eliminating entitlement
programs”).
52. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(d)(2)(B).
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forced many legal service providers to break into separate entities,
one that operates within the federal LSC restrictions and the other
that keeps its “freedom of action” by giving up its LSC grant and
53
using alternate sources of funding. On top of the new restrictions,
Congress cut funding for the LSC by almost a third in 1996, leading
54
to significant cutbacks in staff and office space.
Congress cut funding for the LSC despite a huge demand for free
legal services for the poor. The Census Bureau estimates that in
2002, approximately 34.6 million Americans lived below the poverty
55
line.
An estimated ten million additional Americans potentially
56
qualify for free legal services. Recent studies have reported that
even with current federal, state, and private funding, between seventy
57
and ninety percent of this population’s legal needs go unmet. In
light of the huge demand for legal services and the recent federal
restrictions and funding cuts affecting the LSC, alternative sources of
funding play an increasingly important role in funding legal services
58
for the needy.
53. See Luban, supra note 4, at 221-22 (explaining that the split organizations
were significantly weaker than the original organization because the new
congressional requirements mandated physical and financial separation of the two
organizations); see also Houseman, supra note 51, at 2201-02 (explaining that in order
to use the non-LSC funds the new organization must be a separate legal entity with
its own staff, office space, equipment, financial records, and operational name).
54. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 44 (stating that Congress
cut funding from $400 million in fiscal year 1995 to $278 million in 1996); see also
Quigley, supra note 45, at 260-61 (noting that after the 1996 budget cuts, the LSC was
forced to close over 100 offices and layoff fourteen percent of their attorneys and
sixteen percent of their paralegals); Weissman, supra note 44, at 765 (calling the
federal cutbacks a “crippling loss” to legal service providers).
55. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty, Income See Slight Changes;
Child Poverty Rate Unchanged, Census Bureau Reports (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/cb03-153.html (on file with the
American University Law Review).
56. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 12 (explaining that in addition to those
who fall below the poverty level, individuals who earn between 100 and 125% of the
poverty level may also qualify for legal aid); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b) (2003)
(mandating that an LSC funded legal services provider, in determining eligibility for
free legal services, may not establish a maximum annual income greater than 125%
of the Federal Poverty Income Guidelines).
57. See Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8-9,
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003) (No. 01-1325) [hereinafter
Brief for AARP] (providing citations for studies of unmet legal need); see, e.g., Lynn
E. Cunningham, Legal Needs for the Low-Income Population in Washington, DC, 5
UDC/DCSL L. REV. 21, 58 (2000) (stating that almost ninety percent of the poor’s
legal needs in Washington, DC are not being met); LEGAL SERVS. OF NORTH TEX.,
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT DALLAS VOLUNTEER ATTORNEY PROGRAM, at
http://www.lsnt.org/nav/volist.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (noting that in 1991 Texas failed to meet the legal
needs of approximately seventy percent of its poor citizens).
58. See Houseman, supra note 42, at 1217 (noting the growing importance of
state-level funding of civil legal services).
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IOLTA funds provide a critical alternative source of funding for
59
civil legal services. In 2001, IOLTA programs generated over $200
60
million nationwide. They constitute the second largest source of
61
funding for legal services after the LSC. Also, IOLTA funding gives
legal service providers leverage to acquire funds from additional
62
An organization that receives IOLTA funds acquires
sources.
63
legitimacy, making additional grantors more likely to donate.
Moreover, IOLTA funds are important because legal service
providers can use them to finance basic activities and costs for which
64
other sources of funding are not available.
IOLTA funds support the provision of civil legal services for issues
concerning basic human needs, such as domestic relations, housing,
65
and medical benefits.
Other IOLTA funds support legal-related
activities, including staff training and the provision of self-help
66
materials. IOLTA funds are especially important for populations

59. See Brief for Forty-Nine State Bar Ass’ns and the Nat’l Ass’n of IOLTA
Programs as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003) (No. 01-1325) (stressing the importance of IOLTA in
light of funding cuts on the LSC); see also Anderson, supra note 19, at 720 (citing
IOLTA programs as an example of states’ attempts to develop alternative sources of
funding to provide legal services to the poor in the wake of LSC budget cuts during
the early years of the Reagan administration).
60. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1412.
61. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, IOLTA AND OTHER FUNDING, at
http://www.nlada.org/Civil/Civil_IOLTA/IOLTA_IOLTA/IOLTA_IOLTA_Home
(last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(discussing alternative sources of funding for civil legal services including IOLTA,
state funding, foundation grants, non-LSC federal funding, and private bar
campaigns); see also Katharine L. Smith, IOLTA in the Balance: The Battle of Legality
and Morality Between Robin Hood and the Miser, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 969, 981 (2003)
(comparing IOLTA funds, raising over $200 million in 2001, with the LSC’s budget
for 2002 which exceeded $300 million).
62. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (stating that IOLTA funds “encourage
public and private funders to join the partnership”); Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at
20 (describing the use of IOLTA funds as a platform from which to pursue matching
funds and attract private donors).
63. See Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 20 (maintaining that a legal service
provider who has been approved by an IOLTA grant committee “gives comfort to
other charities with funds to allocate that the grantee is serving a needy community
well”).
64. See id. (stating that IOLTA funds can be used to fill gaps in legal coverage and
for the “bread and butter work,” whereas corporate grants are often earmarked for
specific popular causes).
65. See id. at 14 (indicating that the majority of cases that IOLTA funds finance
are in the areas of family law, domestic violence, housing, public benefits and income
maintenance, and consumer protection); see also Heuer Lantzer, supra note 33, at
1019-20 (stating that IOLTA funds have been used to litigate various cases including,
inter alia, wrongful housing evictions, and issues involving disabled children,
domestic violence, and gay rights).
66. Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 14.
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most in need of legal services, such as children and the elderly, and
68
are critical to small and rural legal service providers.
C. Fifth Amendment Litigation Involving IOLTA Programs
IOLTA programs have been the subject of numerous lawsuits since
69
their inception.
Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”), a nonprofit group that advocates for free enterprise principles and
70
property rights, spearheaded much of that litigation. Most notably,
the WLF challenged the IOLTA programs in Texas and Washington.
These challenges focused on a Fifth Amendment claim against
71
IOLTA.
1.

The challenge to Texas’s IOLTA program
About the time that congressional leaders began their quest to
72
eliminate the LSC in the mid-1990s, the WLF initiated Washington
73
Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, a lawsuit
74
Although the WLF’s
challenging the Texas IOLTA program.
original challenge to the Texas IOLTA program included both First
and Fifth Amendment claims, the courts concentrated almost
75
exclusively on the Fifth Amendment claim.
In 1995, a federal
67. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 14 (explaining that the elderly
frequently need legal assistance to handle health, income, and social needs unique
to their population); see also Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 15-17 (describing
specific examples of cases funded by IOLTA that benefited children and the elderly);
Kristin A. Dulong, Exploring the Fifth Dimension: IOLTA, Professional Responsibility, and
the Takings Clause, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 91, 119 (1997) (stating that IOLTA funds
provide an invaluable service to individuals unable to afford legal services, most
notably children and families).
68. See Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 19-20 (explaining that large corporate
donors and foundations tend to overlook small and rural service providers).
69. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003) (challenging
the IOLTA program in Washington state); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156 (1998) (examining the constitutionality of Texas’s IOLTA program); Wash.
Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993) (assessing claims
against Massachusetts’s IOLTA program); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002
(11th Cir. 1987) (attacking the constitutionality of Florida’s IOLTA program).
70. Information on the Washington Legal Foundation may be found on its
website at http://www.wlf.org. The WLF describes itself as “the nation’s preeminent
center for public interest law, advocating free-enterprise principles, responsible
government, property rights, a strong national security and defense, and balanced
civil and criminal justice system.”
WASH. LEGAL FOUND., WLF MISSION, at
http://www.wlf.org/Resources/WLFMission (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) (on file with
the American University Law Review).
71. See Coyle, supra note 15 (stating that, according to the WLF counsel, the
“primary reason for the IOLTA challenge” was the property rights issue).
72. See supra Part I.B (discussing congressional leaders’ battle against IOLTA in
the mid 1990s).
73. 873 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
74. Id. at 3.
75. See id. (stating that plaintiffs claimed the Texas IOLTA program violated their
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district court in Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, stating that the plaintiffs failed to establish that clients
76
have a property right to the interest formed on the IOLTA account.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
clients have a constitutionally recognizable property right to the
77
interest accumulated in IOLTA accounts.
The case reached the Supreme Court in 1998 in Phillips v.
78
Washington Legal Foundation, where the WLF prevailed in part. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the
interest formed on lawyers’ trust accounts was the private property of
79
the client, but declined to determine whether the IOLTA program
80
constituted a taking for which the state owed just compensation. On
remand for determination of that issue, the district court found that
the IOLTA program did not constitute a taking of property because
81
the client suffered no compensable loss.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit again reversed the district court and
held that Texas’s IOLTA program was a per se taking of private
82
property that warranted declaratory and injunctive relief.
The
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation filed a petition for a writ of
83
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002. While entertaining
the petition, the Court decided Brown v. Legal Foundation of
84
85
Washington, discussed later, which held that IOLTA programs do
not require just compensation because there is no pecuniary loss to
First and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,
interest earned on plaintiffs’ money held in IOLTA accounts and attorneys’ fees); see
also Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d 624,
632 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that “[n]either the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme
Court directly addressed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to IOLTA”).
76. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. at 7.
77. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1000
(5th Cir. 1996).
78. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
79. Id. at 159.
80. See id. at 172 (stating that, “We express no view as to whether these funds
have been ‘taken’ by the State; nor do we express an opinion as to the amount of
‘just compensation,’ if any, due respondents. We leave these issues to be addressed
on remand.”).
81. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d
624, 643 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (asserting that “without IOLTA the interest generated . . .
would possess no economically realizable value”). The district court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. Id. at 636. See infra Part II.C (discussing the
district court’s analysis of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim).
82. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 182
(5th Cir. 2001).
83. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180
(5th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3622 (U.S. June 26, 2002) (No. 0201) (asking the court to review the Fifth Circuit’s opinion).
84. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
85. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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87

the client.
In light of the Brown decision, the Court granted
certiorari to Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation in March 2003,
immediately vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the
88
case back to the Fifth Circuit for review.
The Fifth Circuit
89
subsequently dismissed the case.
2.

The challenge to Washington’s IOLTA program
In 1997, the WLF, along with a group of other plaintiffs, also
90
brought suit against the state of Washington’s IOLTA program. The
district court, in a ruling just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Phillips, granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
basis that the plaintiff clients did not have a property interest in the
91
earnings generated from the IOLTA accounts. On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel ruled that the clients did have a
property right to the interest formed on IOLTA accounts and that
92
the IOLTA program committed a per se taking of that property. The
Ninth Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc and reversed the
93
panel decision. The en banc court held that the IOLTA program
94
did not amount to a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Although the plaintiffs brought their original suit under both the

86. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1421.
87. See id. (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that because compensation for
the plaintiffs would be negligible, there was no real ‘taking’ of the plaintiffs’
property).
88. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 123 S. Ct. 1654 (2003).
89. See Press Release, Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, Fifth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals Dismisses Case Against Texas IOLTA Program (Nov. 7, 2003)
(stating that the parties signed a joint dismissal agreement).
90. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2001) (noting that the plaintiffs appealed the case from the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, D.C. No. CV-97-00146-JCC); see
also COMM’N ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS’ TRUST ACCOUNTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, WASHINGTON
STATE IOLTA LITIGATION [hereinafter WASHINGTON STATE IOLTA LITIGATION], at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/waliti.html (last modified Dec. 2, 2002)
(on file with the American University Law Review) (providing the procedural history
of the Washington IOLTA litigation and links to information and analysis about the
litigation). In addition to WLF, the plaintiffs included four Limited Practice Officers
(“LPOs”), individuals who periodically hold clients’ funds in real estate transactions
much like lawyers temporarily hold client funds. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1415. The
Washington state IOLTA rules are applicable to LPOs in addition to lawyers. Id.
91. WASHINGTON STATE IOLTA LITIGATION, supra note 90.
92. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir.
2001).
93. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc).
94. See id. at 864 (noting that “even if the IOLTA program constituted a taking
of . . . private property, . . . just compensation is nil”).
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First and Fifth Amendments, the appellate court declined to address
95
the First Amendment issue.
The Washington litigation reached the U.S. Supreme Court in
96
2003 in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.
The Court
addressed the issues it left out of the Phillips decision—namely,
whether the IOLTA program’s transfer of money to legal service
providers constituted a taking, and whether client contributors were
97
entitled to just compensation.
The Court determined that the
transfer of interest earned on clients’ IOLTA funds to a legitimate
charitable organization may amount to a taking that entitles the
98
client to just compensation. However, the Court held that clients’
just compensation was zero because they suffered no pecuniary loss at
99
the hands of the IOLTA program. Absent the IOLTA program, the
100
Neither the
clients would not have accrued any net interest.
majority nor the primary dissent in Brown addressed the First
Amendment compelled speech claim against IOLTA, leaving it open
to further litigation.
II. COMPELLED SPEECH: THEORIES AND CASELAW
A. Associated First Amendment Rights Protected by the Constitution
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress
101
The
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment also protects
associated rights not explicitly mentioned in the text of the
102
Amendment. For example, in 1958 the Court formally recognized
103
The Court has also held that the First
a freedom of association.
95. See Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d at 1103-04 (“We do not reach the First
Amendment questions, because we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to relief on
their Fifth Amendment claim.”).
96. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1415 (2003) (explaining
that the Court limited its discussion to the claims brought by plaintiffs Allen Brown
and Greg Hayes because no parties challenged the Court of Appeals holding that
WLF and two other plaintiff individuals did not have standing).
97. Id. at 1411.
98. Id. at 1421.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 11.5 (2d ed. 2002) (reviewing the First Amendment’s protection of
freedom of association); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1323 (14th ed. 2001) (discussing rights ancillary to freedom of
speech).
103. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that Alabama’s
order requiring the NAACP to reveal the names and addresses of its members was an
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Amendment protects the corollary of the freedom to speak and
104
associate—that is, the freedom not to speak and not to associate.
The Court explained in Wooley v. Maynard, “The right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
105
the broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”
Later, in
106
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court reasoned that “an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
107
rather than coerced by the State.”
A compelled speech violation may occur when the government
108
forces an individual to affirm a belief. In West Virginia State Board of
109
Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state law requiring students to salute the flag because it required
110
“affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.”
Similarly, in
Wooley, the Court ruled that a Jehovah’s Witness could not be
criminally sanctioned for covering the motto on his New Hampshire
111
license plate—“Live Free or Die.”
Despite the absolute language of the First Amendment, freedom of
speech and association and their corollary rights are not absolute

unconstitutional violation of those members’ right to freedom of association).
104. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (stating that the “right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”).
105. Id.; see also Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum
Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169 (2002) (reviewing four categories of compelled
expression: (1) compelled utterance or presentation of a message; (2) compelled
subsidization of private expression; (3) compelled subsidization of private expression
pursuant to a government program; and (4) compelled subsidization of
government’s expressive and nonexpressive activities).
106. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
107. Id. at 234-35.
108. See Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First
Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 431,
464-65 (2003) (stating that protection against compelled speech is an important
aspect of modern free speech jurisprudence and reviewing landmark cases regarding
compelled speech); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 451, 451-52 (1995) (suggesting that the pledge of allegiance is unconstitutional
when led by teachers in public schools because the psychological pressure on
students to recite the pledge violates their right not to speak); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Policy, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1141, 1193-1203 (1997) (arguing that the Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell policy, in requiring gay service members to remain silent about their
sexual identity, effectively compels them to make false affirmations of their identity
and beliefs in violation of the First Amendment).
109. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
110. Id. at 633.
111. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (finding that a state may not
“constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property”).
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rights. For instance, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme
Court held that a State may infringe upon an individual’s First
Amendment rights to “serve compelling state interests, unrelated to
the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
114
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”
There, the
Court upheld a Minnesota statute requiring a traditionally male
organization to admit women on the grounds that Minnesota’s
interest in eliminating gender discrimination justified the
115
infringement on the male members’ freedom of association.
Compelled financial support of organizations participating in
expressive activities also has the potential to impact First Amendment
116
interests.
As Thomas Jefferson once stated, “to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
117
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”
But, forcing an
individual to subsidize speech is not necessarily a violation of the First
118
119
Amendment. In Board of Regents v. Southworth, the Supreme Court
upheld a program that distributed mandatory student activity fees to
student organizations, some of which engaged in political and

112. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting the
interpretation of freedom of speech and association as absolute rights); see also
Donald E. Lively, The First Amendment at its Third Century: Reckoning with the Ravages of
Time, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 259, 264 (1991) (suggesting that the qualified nature
of First Amendment freedoms allow for use of analytical reference points that would
be precluded if the guarantees were absolute).
113. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
114. Id. at 623.
115. See id. (explaining that the statute protects Minnesotans from serious social
and political harms).
116. See Jay Carlson, Interest or Principles: The Legal Challenge to IOLTA in Washington
State, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (1999) (observing that the Supreme Court has
ruled that organizations involved in “expressive activities” are limited in their ability
to compel members to provide financial support for those activites); Monte Arthur
Mills, Note, The Student, the First Amendment, and the Mandatary Fee, 85 IOWA L. REV.
387, 394 (1999) (stating that mandatory student fees implicate the freedom of
association by compelling students to provide financial support to private
organizations).
117. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948). The Court
quotes this statement of Jefferson’s in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209,
235 n.31 (1977).
118. See Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the view that the government violates the First Amendment every time it
compels one to subsidize speech would implicate state subsidies of public
universities); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (stating that if
everyone could insist that organizations receiving public funds could not express an
unpopular opinion, then public debate over important issues would be significantly
curtailed); see also Christine Theroux, Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory
Student Activity Fee Systems: All Students Benefit, 33 CONN. L. REV. 691, 696 (2001)
(noting that the government subsidizes the speech that takes place in a public
university forum).
119. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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ideological speech, because of the university’s important interest in
120
maintaining an open forum for speech.
First Amendment suits involving IOLTA fall in the compelled
financial support category. Opponents of IOLTA object to being
121
forced to pay for speech and expression with which they disagree.
122
They view litigation as an inherently expressive activity.
Although the Supreme Court has not examined the compelled
speech claim against IOLTA, it has decided cases concerning
compelled financial support in several other contexts, including
123
124
125
union fees, bar association dues, and student activity fees. The
remainder of this section will examine these Supreme Court cases
and then discuss two lower court decisions involving compelled
speech-based challenges to IOLTA programs.

120. See id. at 231 (determining that viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of
program funding protects the students’ First Amendment rights).
121. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1415 (2003) (noting that
the plaintiff asserted that IOLTA funding violates the freedom of association by
forcing individuals to associate with the Recipient Organizations); see also
Fundraising letter from Washington Legal Foundation (Sept. 4, 2002), reprinted in
Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at Appendix C (soliciting funds to “deal a death blow
to the single most important source of income for radical legal groups all across the
country” including “groups dedicated to the homeless, to minorities, to gay and
lesbian causes, and any other group that has drawn money from hard-working
Americans like you and me to support its radical cause”). The letter further states,
“It’s an abomination that IOLTA can take money that is rightly the property of
Americans like you and me and use that money to support programs we oppose.”
Id.; Charles Lane, Washington State’s Legal Aid Program Challenged; Conservative Group’s
Suit Has Broad Import for How States Raise Funds to Defend the Needy, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 2002, at A4.
122. See Coyle, supra note 15 (quoting Richard Samp, counsel for Washington
Legal Foundation, arguing that forcing people to fund litigation they believe to be
objectionable is a violation of the First Amendment). See generally Maximillian A.
Grant, The Right Not to Sue: A First Amendment Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory
Class Actions, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 249 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
recognition of litigation as a form of expression protected by the First Amendment).
123. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that a
union may not use mandatory dues for activities unrelated to its purpose of collective
bargaining).
124. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (finding that a bar
association may not use mandatory fees to fund activities not germane to the bar’s
purpose of regulating the legal profession).
125. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000) (holding that a
public university may use mandatory student fees to fund student organizations as
long as it distributes funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner).
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B. Compelled Financial Support Decisions
126

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
In 1977, the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment
challenge to state legislation that mandated all local government
employees to pay a service fee to their union, regardless of whether
127
or not they were union members. For union members, the service
fee constituted union dues; however, non-union members were also
128
The plaintiffs, who refused to
required to pay the same amount.
pay the dues, argued that the state-enacted system for union
representation violated the First Amendment rights of employees
who did not support collective bargaining or other activities funded
129
by the fees.
The Court acknowledged that requiring non-union members to
financially support the union implicated non-members’ First
Amendment rights because non-members might oppose the position
130
that the union takes as bargaining agent.
The Court determined,
however, that the impact on First Amendment rights was justified
because the system played an important role in labor relations and
because, absent mandatory dues, non-union members would benefit
131
for free from the work of the union.
Therefore, the union could
require non-members to pay dues that the union used for collective
132
bargaining activities.
At the same time, the Court held that the union could not use nonmember dues to finance activities “unrelated to its duties as exclusive
133
bargaining representative.” The Court explained that the only dues
the union could use to express political views and engage in activities
not germane to its ultimate purpose as a collective bargaining agent
were those from employees who supported the union’s views and
134
activities.
The Court cautioned that drawing a line between

1.

126. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
127. See id. at 211 (explaining that such an arrangement between a union and a
local government employer is called an “agency shop” arrangement).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 222 (describing potential objections that an employee may have to
union activity, such as objecting to the terms that a union negotiates concerning the
right to strike).
131. See id. (rationalizing that absent a union shop agreement, employees would
have incentive not to contribute to the union, because they would still receive its
benefits).
132. See id. at 223 (stating that an individual could not revoke his contribution to a
union just because he disagreed with its strategy).
133. Id. at 234.
134. Id. at 235-36.
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activities related and unrelated to collective bargaining would be a
135
difficult task.
136

Keller v. State Bar of California
The Supreme Court used reasoning similar to that used in Abood to
137
decide a First Amendment challenge to the State Bar of California.
California’s bar was an “integrated bar,” meaning that the ability to
practice law in the state was contingent on bar membership and
138
dues. The plaintiffs in Keller argued that the bar’s use of their dues
toward certain ideological and political activities with which they
139
disagreed violated their right to free speech. The Court, following
the standard that it articulated in Abood, held that the California bar
could use mandatory dues to finance activities, so long as the funded
140
activities were germane to the goals of the bar. Thus, the impact on
the bar members’ First Amendment interests was “justified by the
State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the
141
quality of legal services.” The State bar could not, however, use the
142
dues to finance non-bar related, ideological activities.
Again, the Court noted the difficulty in distinguishing between
activities that advanced, and those that did not advance, the essential
143
purpose of the organization.
This time, however, the Court gave
examples of what would or would not be considered germane to the
144
organization.
Examples of permissible activities were disciplining
bar members and developing rules of conduct for attorneys; activities
not germane to the State Bar’s purpose included endorsing a gun
145
control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative.
2.

135. See id. at 236 (declining to establish a dividing line between permissible and
impermissible uses of union funds).
136. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
137. See id. at 13-14 (finding that mandatory bar dues, like the mandatory union
dues at issue in Abood, serve a substantial public interest—in this case, the regulation
of the legal profession).
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 15.
144. See id. at 15-16 (maintaining that while the separation between permissible
and impermissible activities is not easy to determine, the “extreme ends of the
spectrum are clear”).
145. Id. at 16.
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146

Board of Regents v. Southworth
More recently, in Southworth, the Supreme Court distinguished
Abood and Keller from a challenge to a public university’s mandatory
147
student activity fee.
The University of Wisconsin charged its
students a student activity fee used in part to fund student groups
148
that engaged in political and ideological speech.
A group of
Wisconsin students that objected to some of the viewpoints of the
funded groups argued that the mandatory fee violated their rights to
149
free speech, free association, and free exercise. The Court rejected
the students’ argument, holding that the infringement on the
students’ First Amendment rights was justified by the “important and
substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate a wide
150
range of speech.”
In upholding the student activity fee, the Court determined that
the standard of germane speech that it used in Abood and Keller was
151
unworkable in the university context. The Court stated that it was
not in a position to decide what speech was germane to the goals of a
152
university. Instead, the Court concluded that the proper standard
for protecting the students’ First Amendment interests was viewpoint
153
neutrality. As long as the university distributed the funds to student
groups in a viewpoint-neutral manner, the university could continue
154
to collect mandatory student activity fees.
3.

146. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
147. See id. at 230 (stating that while Abood and Keller “identify the interests of the
protesting students, the means of implementing First Amendment protections
adopted in those decisions are neither applicable nor workable in the context of
extracurricular student speech at a university”).
148. See id. at 221-23 (providing examples of student groups receiving money,
including the Future Financial Gurus of America, the International Socialist
Organization, the College Democrats, the College Republicans, and the American
Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter).
149. Id. at 227.
150. See id. at 231-32 (describing the speech the university sought to facilitate as
“distinguished . . . by its vast, unexplored bounds”).
151. See id. (determining that the germane standard does not adequately protect
the First Amendment rights of either the objecting students or the University
program because it is nearly impossible for the court to determine what speech is
germane to the University’s purpose).
152. See id. at 232 (asserting that attempting to determine what speech is germane
to a university runs counter to the university’s goal of “stimulating the whole universe
of speech and ideas”).
153. See id. at 233 (remarking that the mandatory student fee was justified by the
viewpoint-neutral purpose of creating a mechanism for open dialogue).
154. Id. at 233-34.
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C. First Amendment Challenges to IOLTA Programs
Only two courts have evaluated First Amendment claims against
155
IOLTA programs.
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts
Bar Foundation, the First Circuit articulated a two-step process for
156
analyzing the legality of the state’s IOLTA program. The first step
was to determine whether the program violated First Amendment
interests “by forcing expression through compelled support of
organizations espousing ideologies or engaging in political
157
activities.”
If so, the second step was to apply strict scrutiny to
determine whether the IOLTA program was narrowly tailored and
158
germane to a compelling state interest.
The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts IOLTA program did
159
not violate First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.
Writing pre-Phillips, the court stated that “the interest earned on
IOLTA accounts belong[ed] to no one, but had been assigned [to
160
the Massachusetts IOLTA program].”
Thus, the IOLTA program
did not compel the client to financially support any of the recipient
organizations because the interest earned on IOLTA accounts was
161
not deemed the property of the client.
It followed that no
connection existed between the plaintiffs and the IOLTA recipients
such that the plaintiffs could reasonably believe they were supporting
162
the recipients’ viewpoints.
The court distinguished the case from
Abood and Keller, where the plaintiffs became involuntarily associated
with the ideological and political activities of the union and bar
163
association.
The First Circuit did not consider whether the program met strict
scrutiny because it found in the first step of its analysis that the
164
IOLTA program did not burden protected speech.
However, in
light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Phillips that the interest
155. Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 968 (1st Cir. 1993);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d 624, 627
(W.D. Tex. 2000).
156. 993 F.2d at 977.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 980.
160. Id. The court characterized the IOLTA program as “an anomaly created by
the practicalities of accounting, banking practices, and the ethical obligation of
lawyers.” Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 979.
163. See id. at 980 (observing that plaintiffs have not been forced to “join, affirm,
support or subsidize ideological expression of IOLTA recipient organizations in any
way”).
164. Id. at 980.
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formed on IOLTA accounts is the property of the client, the main
premise of the First Circuit’s reasoning has been invalidated.
Seven years later, in 2000, a federal district court in Washington
166
Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation evaluated a
First Amendment claim against Texas’s IOLTA program using a
167
different analysis. Because the Supreme Court had decided Phillips
by the time the district court in Texas decided the case, the district
court began with the premise that the interest generated on each
deposit in an IOLTA account belonged to the owner of its
168
principal. The court stated that a valid claim of compelled financial
support required a showing that an involuntary contribution was used
to support a political or ideological message that did not advance a
169
governmental interest.
In the first step of its analysis, the district court assumed that the
plaintiff client was forced to contribute involuntarily to IOLTA
because he did not even know about the IOLTA program until some
170
time after his funds were placed in an IOLTA account.
Next, the
court examined the plaintiffs’ contention that litigation is an innately
expressive activity and that therefore the IOLTA program, which
171
facilitates litigation, implicates the compelled speech doctrine.
In
particular, the plaintiffs argued that IOLTA funds supported
ideological and political activities such as representing illegal aliens
172
in deportation cases.
The district court determined that, in
general, the provision of civil legal services for the poor did not
173
constitute expression or political or ideological activity.
However,
the district court found that the IOLTA program’s support of certain
litigation having political and ideological elements could qualify as
174
expression and be subject to a First Amendment claim.
165. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
166. 86 F. Supp. 2d 624 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
167. Id. at 627.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 634 (noting that the government violates the First Amendment
when it forces one to finance another’s ideological expression in order to promote
that message and not a legitimate government interest).
170. Id. at 634-35. See Cecily W. Kerr, Note, Nothing Taken, Something Gained: State
Action as an Alternative Defense for IOLTA Programs in the Aftermath of Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1543, 1553 (1999) (stating that the
client in Phillips gave his attorney a retainer in December of 1992 but did not
discover that his money was placed into an IOLTA account until 1994, at which time
he commenced a lawsuit).
171. See Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
172. Id. The plaintiffs also contended that IOLTA funds had been used to
support a lawsuit to overturn election results. Id.
173. See id. (“The concept of helping ensure equal access to the justice system for
low income citizens is in itself a non-controversial idea.”).
174. Id.
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In part three of the district court’s analysis, the court considered
whether the IOLTA-funded activities were “germane to an otherwise
lawful regulatory program” and whether the activities “support[ed] a
substantial public interest—that of supplying legal services to the
175
poor.” The court concluded that facilitating the provision of legal
services was a “vital policy interest” and that the activities which
176
IOLTA funded were germane to that interest.
In contrast to the
bar association in Keller, Texas’s IOLTA program did not use funds to
177
Because the compelled financial
lobby and influence legislation.
support of IOLTA did not significantly burden free speech, the
178
district court rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.
Although the district court in Texas did not directly articulate a
level of scrutiny in its three step analysis of the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims, it did address the application of levels of scrutiny
in a footnote, stating that the IOLTA program is content neutral and
179
therefore intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of analysis.
The court then determined that the IOLTA program advanced an
important government interest and that the program impacted First
180
Amendment rights no more than necessary to achieve that interest.
Although the court appeared to imply that the IOLTA program
181
would pass strict scrutiny analysis, it declined to so state explicitly,
noting that the parties had not advanced any arguments based on
182
strict scrutiny.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation is the starting point for this
Comment’s First Amendment analysis of IOLTA programs. Like the
federal district court in Texas, this Comment concludes that IOLTA
programs do not violate the First Amendment. However, the district
court’s analysis in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation did not
consider all possible results that a court might reach. It did not
address the relationship between compelled contributors and
183
objectionable speech in the context of compelled financial support.
175. Id. at 636.
176. See id. (claiming that plaintiffs provided no evidence of any situation in which
IOLTA funds were not used for the provision of legal services).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 636 n.6.
180. See id. at 636 (suggesting that the provision of free legal services would be
accomplished less effectively without the IOLTA program).
181. See id. (stating that, “The Court is prepared to determine if the IOLTA
program is narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest of making legal services
accessible to all citizens”).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 633-34 (addressing, instead, the relationship between the plaintiffs
and the objectionable speech in the “right not to speak” line of cases).
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Moreover, it addressed intermediate scrutiny briefly in a footnote but
184
With a Supreme Court
included no discussion of strict scrutiny.
divided on the constitutionality of IOLTA programs, and with no
established standard for evaluating compelled financial support
claims, it is unclear whether a court would even find that IOLTA
programs substantially implicate First Amendment rights in the first
185
place.
If a court were to find that First Amendment rights are
implicated, it is not evident whether it would analyze IOLTA
programs using intermediate or strict scrutiny. Taking from the
lower court decisions and from the Supreme Court’s treatment of
compelled financial support in other contexts, this Comment
suggests that a First Amendment challenge to IOLTA programs lacks
merit under either level of scrutiny.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF IOLTA PROGRAMS
In evaluating a compelled financial support claim against IOLTA
programs, one must first determine whether the forced subsidy
186
implicates an IOLTA contributor’s First Amendment rights.
A
court may conclude that it does not, as the connection between the
187
forced contribution and any expressive speech is an attenuated one.
If a sufficient connection is found, the court will analyze whether the
government program justifies the impact on First Amendment rights
188
using either an intermediate or a strict scrutiny level of review. In
general, a court will use intermediate scrutiny to analyze a content189
neutral regulation.
Content-neutral regulations are unrelated to
184. See id. at 636 n.6 (finding that the Texas IOLTA program withstands an
intermediate scrutiny analysis, but making no explicit findings as to strict scrutiny).
185. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1421 (2003) (voting 5-4
on the constitutionality of the IOLTA accounts under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
186. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2001) (stating that the
mandatory student activity fee implicates students’ rights to free speech); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (finding that requiring employees to
pay union dues impacts employees’ First Amendment interests); Tex. Equal Access to
Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35 (assuming that plaintiff was required to
involuntarily contribute to the Texas IOLTA program and that certain of the
program’s activities could qualify as expressive, thereby implicating plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights).
187. See infra Part III.A (suggesting that if the compelled contributor and the
objectionable speech lack a clear connection, the IOLTA program does not
implicate the contributor’s First Amendment rights).
188. Compare Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 980 (1st Cir.
1993) (viewing IOLTA as content based and applying strict scrutiny), with Tex. Equal
Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 636 n.6 (viewing IOLTA as content-neutral
and appropriate for intermediate scrutiny).
189. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining that
content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, and not strict
scrutiny, because they do not create the same danger of purging particular views
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190

the content of the speech.
If, on the other hand, a regulation is
191
A contentcontent based, it must survive strict scrutiny to stand.
192
based regulation is one that restricts speech based on its message.
This Comment considers both intermediate and strict scrutiny to
demonstrate that IOLTA programs are constitutional.
A. The Connection Between Forced Contributors to IOLTA and the Speech
They Find Objectionable
The courts in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation and
Massachusetts Bar Foundation distinguished compelled financial
subsidy situations, like that of IOLTA programs, from compelled
193
speech cases involving direct affirmations of a belief.
Both courts
concluded that IOLTA programs do not force contributors to affirm
a belief and rejected assertions that IOLTA contributors were directly
194
identified with expressions to which they objected.
Nevertheless,
the courts permitted the plaintiffs to challenge IOLTA programs on
from public dialogue as do content-based regulations). See generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 102, § 11.2.1 (explaining that a higher level of scrutiny is needed where
there is a risk that the government may try to suppress unpopular ideas).
190. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (stating that a court decides how to
evaluate a regulation by ascertaining whether the government established the
regulation because it agreed or disagreed with its message). For example, the
Supreme Court determined that an ordinance which prohibited posting signs on
public utility poles was content neutral because it did not differentiate based on the
message of the signs. Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984). See also Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 656 (1991) (noting that if the harm the
government is trying to prevent arises from the “communicative impact” of the
speech then the regulation is content based, whereas regulations not directed at the
communicative impact of speech and without “discriminatory purpose” towards
speech are content-neutral).
191. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (stating that the Court applies strict
scrutiny to “regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content”). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47, at
579 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that a state must show both that its content-based
regulation serves a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to that
interest).
192. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (stating that in addition to prohibitions
on speech, “[laws] that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a
particular message” are subject to strict scrutiny).
193. See Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 977 (describing direct compelled speech and
forced subsidies of organizations engaging in expressive speech as separate issues);
Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 633 (referring to the right not to
speak and the right not to be forced to financially support others’ speech as “two
distinct lines of cases”).
194. See Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 977 (concluding that direct compelled
speech is not a concern in the context of IOLTA because IOLTA programs do not
compel contributors to affirm a belief); Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp.
2d at 633-34 (determining that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was being
identified with the speech to which he objected).
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the premise that compelled financial support of organizations alone
195
implicates First Amendment rights.
The courts in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation and
Massachusetts Bar Foundation did not address the connection between
forced contributors and objectionable speech as it relates to claims of
compelled financial support.
However, Justice Souter, in his
concurrence in Southworth, did address the issue in the context of
196
student activity fees.
Justice Souter distinguished the connection
between forced contributors and objectionable speech in Southworth
197
from that in Abood and Keller.
In Abood and Keller, the forced
contributor paid money directly to the union or bar association, the
very organization espousing the objectionable message, while in
Southworth, the student paid money to a program which then
198
distributed money to various student groups.
The program to
which students paid the activity fee did not in itself engage in any
199
social, political, or ideological activities. Therefore, Souter argued,
the “clear connection” between compelled contributor and offensive
message in the union and bar association cases was not evident in the
200
context of student activity fees.
The lack of a clear connection between forced contributor and
offensive speech in the student activity fee context is similarly absent
in the IOLTA context. Interest earned on IOLTA accounts is
transferred to a state-established foundation or organization that
facilitates the distribution of funds to legal service providers in the
201
state.
Like the program to which students paid activity fees in
Southworth, IOLTA programs themselves do not engage in political
and ideological activities, nor do they advocate a particular point of
202
view; rather, they act as distributing agencies. As the federal district
court in Texas stated “[t]he concept of helping ensure equal access
195. See Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 977 (outlining a two-step process for
analyzing plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims); Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F.
Supp. 2d at 634 (setting forth a three-prong test for analyzing compelled
contribution cases).
196. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236-43 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that viewpoint neutrality is an important consideration in the
context of mandatory student fees and, in this case, acts to sufficiently protect
students’ First Amendment rights).
197. See id. at 240.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (explaining how IOLTA programs
distribute IOLTA funds).
202. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d
624, 633 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (finding “no specific message is dictated by the variety of
legal services that TEAJF funds with IOLTA dollars”).
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to the justice system for low income citizens is in itself a noncontroversial idea, and therefore does not qualify as a political or
203
ideological activity.”
Even if, as the court in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation
accepted, particular litigation may contain ideological elements, a
compelled contributor cannot readily prove a connection between
204
the contributed funds and the offensive speech.
An IOLTA
program distributes funds to legal service providers throughout the
205
A compelled contributor cannot show which legal service
state.
206
provider receives the contributor’s money.
Because the great
majority of legal services for the poor cannot reasonably be
characterized as political or ideological speech, the contributor
cannot assert that his or her money has more than a small possibility
207
of supporting the objectionable speech.
Nor does a compelled
contributor have reason to know whether the legal service provider is
using a source of funds other than IOLTA to finance particular
208
litigation that may be objectionable.
For these reasons, the
contributor may not be able to demonstrate a connection between
his or her contribution and the objectionable speech.
Justice Souter’s concurrence did not rest entirely on the lack of a
clear connection between the compelled contribution and
209
objectionable speech.
However, the lack of connection in the
IOLTA context suggests that the compelled financial support claim
may not raise First Amendment interests. If a court does not view the
attenuated connection between the compelled contribution and
203. Id. at 635.
204. See Luban, supra note 4, at 235 (contending that “[f]unding speech,
indirectly and at a distance is not the same as associating with the speaker”).
205. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (explaining that funds generated by IOLTA
accounts are earmarked for access to justice and are distributed through local grant
processes to state non-profit organizations).
206. See Luban, supra note 4, at 235 (noting that because IOLTA grants are used
to fund civil legal services for the poor generally, and are not directed at individual
providers or services, contributors to IOLTA do not know who specifically receives
IOLTA money or what issues lawyers working with IOLTA funds will argue).
207. See Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (determining that
the provision of legal services for the poor in itself is not a political or ideological
activity, but that certain litigation may have ideological elements).
208. See Luban, supra note 4, at 235 (likening IOLTA contributors to taxpayers
and consumers who are “thinly and anonymously connected to any particular
expenditure of their money”); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 61
(listing sources of funding other than the LSC and IOLTA of which legal service
attorneys make use).
209. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 240-43 (2001) (discussing
reasons in addition to the attenuation argument for which Souter would uphold the
student activity fee program, namely its purpose of facilitating broad public dialogue,
the clear educational value of the program, and the setting of the program within a
university).
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objectionable speech as sufficient to preclude a First Amendment
challenge against IOLTA programs, it will evaluate IOLTA programs
using either intermediate or strict scrutiny to determine whether the
government’s interest justifies the forced contribution.
B. Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny Analysis of IOLTA Programs
IOLTA programs do not fit neatly into either the content-neutral
210
or content-based categories.
A court might view IOLTA programs
as content neutral, on the basis that legal representation, while
perhaps an expressive activity, is not an expressive activity about a
211
particular subject.
Recipients of IOLTA funds represent poor
212
clients in a broad range of matters. The purpose of IOLTA
programs is to provide legal representation on behalf of indigent
213
clients, not to promote a message.
Alternatively, a court might hold that IOLTA programs are content
based because the provision of legal services has, over the years, taken
214
on political and ideological overtones.
In its complaint in Phillips,
the WLF claimed that the Texas IOLTA program forced clients to
finance “various ‘liberal’ causes, such as the expansion of antidiscrimination rights” and the “expansion of the rights of
215
undocumented aliens.”
A court may regard states that have
implemented mandatory IOLTA programs as having “taken sides in
216
the culture war.”
Indeed, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Brown,
210. See supra Part II.C (showing that the First Circuit treated the Massachusetts
IOLTA program as content-based, while a district court in Texas treated the Texas
IOLTA program as content-neutral).
211. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (describing the view that the
Texas IOLTA program is content-neutral).
212. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (providing examples of issues
for which IOLTA funded attorneys provide representation).
213. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (determining
that an attorney providing free legal services speaks on behalf of his client, not on
behalf of a governmental message); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to
Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d 624, 636 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (stating that the only
purpose of the Texas IOLTA program is to finance legal representation for indigent
persons).
214. See Luban, supra note 4, at 234 (commenting that opponents of IOLTA
consider lawyers for the indigent “political adversaries”); Weissman, supra note 44, at
761-67 (describing the attack on legal services in the mid 1990s as motivated by
ideological objectives and argued along political lines).
215. Joint Appendix at 9-10, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998)
(No. 96-1578) (filed Feb. 7, 1994). See Weissman, supra note 44, at 762 (noting that
in congressional debates over the funding of the LSC, opponents of the LSC accused
it of “taking money away from law-abiding, hard-working taxpayers and then giving it
to the likes of convicted felons, delinquent fathers, illegal aliens, and even to drug
dealers” and of “exacerbat[ing] illegal immigration”).
216. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2497 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the Court of having abandoned its role as neutral observer and adopted
the “law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture”); Charles Lane, Civil Liberties were
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suggests that IOLTA programs constitute “Robin Hood Taking[s], in
which . . . the object of the government’s larcenous beneficence is so
highly favored by the courts . . . that the normal rules of the
217
Constitution protecting private property are suspended.”
1.

Intermediate scrutiny
If a court construes IOLTA programs to be content-neutral, it will
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to assess its impact on First
218
Amendment freedoms. To pass an intermediate level of scrutiny, a
regulation must advance important government interests unrelated
to the suppression of speech, and it must not burden substantially
219
more speech than necessary to further those interests.
Facilitating the provision of legal services for the needy should be
220
viewed as an important governmental interest.
The Supreme
Court, in Keller, determined that “improving the quality of legal
221
service to people of the State . . . is a legitimate end of state policy.”
In Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, the federal district court
found that IOLTA upheld the “government’s ‘vital policy interest’ of
222
making legal services accessible to all.”
Numerous organizations,
such as the American Bar Association and the Association for the
Advancement of Retired Persons (“AARP”) have affirmed the
223
importance of providing legal services for the poor. The provision
Term’s Big Winner: Supreme Court’s Moderate Rulings a Surprise, WASH. POST, June 29,
2003, at A18 (stating that “[c]onservatives had denounced [IOLTA] as a forced
subsidy of left wing lawyers”).
217. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1428 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
218. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that a
court determines if a regulation is content neutral by ascertaining whether the
government established the regulation because it agreed or disagreed with its
message).
219. Compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a
city’s volume control ordinance against a First Amendment claim because it was
narrowly tailored to advance the government’s important interest of preventing
excessive sound volume at a concert), with Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(finding that the governmental purpose of maintaining clean streets was insufficient
to justify the burden on speech created by an ordinance that prohibited distributing
literature in streets and other public places).
220. See Luban, supra note 4, at 234 (arguing that the provision of legal services to
the needy is a “core function of the judicial system”).
221. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 8 (1990).
222. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d
624, 636 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507
(1991)).
223. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (contending that IOLTA programs uphold
a “cornerstone of democracy” by providing access to the rule of law to those who
could not afford it otherwise); see also Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 7-11 (stating
that IOLTA programs are central to “the fulfillment of this country’s aspirations to
provide a fair and open system of justice”).

WEBBER.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

2003]

EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW

3/2/2004 11:11 AM

521

of lawyers for indigent persons is critical because the existence of laws
224
Rather,
alone do not provide protection against their violation.
“[l]aws . . . require aggrieved parties to advance their claims for
resolution in order to provide form and content to the concept of
225
legal rights.”
IOLTA programs make it possible for hundreds of
thousands of indigent individuals to bring claims with capable
226
representation.
Absent IOLTA programs, indigent clients likely
227
would be unable to secure alternate counsel.
Even if a court finds the provision of legal services to the poor to be
an important governmental interest, it must still assess whether that
228
interest justifies infringement on First Amendment rights.
IOLTA
programs do not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
promote the government’s interest in facilitating the provision of
legal services for the needy. In Abood and Keller, the Court
determined that the union and bar association could finance with
mandatory dues those activities and speech germane to the purpose
229
of the institutions.
Under the germane standard, then, states may
use interest on IOLTA accounts toward activities germane to the
purpose of IOLTA—namely, “maintaining and improving access to
230
the justice system in communities across the United States.”
In
both Abood and Keller, the Court noted the difficulty in determining
231
whether an activity is germane to the institution’s purpose.
While
no court has yet established a guideline for identifying activities
germane to IOLTA’s purpose, funding legal service providers who
represent indigent clients is a logical way to promote equal access to

224. See Weissman, supra note 44, at 747 (arguing that because laws are not selfserving, lawyers are necessary to give meaning to the rule of law).
225. Id.
226. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (describing how IOLTA programs
strengthen the community by facilitating the provision of legal services for the poor).
227. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (asserting that
without a free legal service provider, the poor often have no other way to learn about
their rights relating to a claim).
228. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1977) (evaluating whether
New Hampshire’s interest in forcing plaintiffs to display the state motto on their
license plates outweighed plaintiffs’ First Amendment protections).
229. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of
Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
230. See COMM’N ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS’ TRUST ACCOUNTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, IOLTA
AT WORK, at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltspot.html (last visited
Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing links to
organizations and activities funded by IOLTA programs).
231. See supra notes 135, 143-45 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulty
the court has experienced in distinguishing between activities which are essential to
the institution’s purpose, and those activities which are not essential and are
therefore impermissible).
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the justice system and should therefore be considered germane to
232
IOLTA.
Still, opponents of IOLTA may object to the use of their interest to
fund particular activities and speech they deem ideological or
233
political.
In light of opposition over the years to the provision of
legal services for the poor, states have instituted guidelines for how
234
IOLTA recipient organizations may use IOLTA funds.
Common
restrictions prohibit organizations from using IOLTA funds to
represent clients in class actions, to support political candidates, and
235
to undertake activities to influence legislation.
Therefore, state
IOLTA programs have rules in place to prevent IOLTA funds from
being used for activities and speech that have real potential for falling
outside the bounds of content-neutral activities.
In contrast to Abood and Keller, the Court in Southworth determined
236
that the germane standard was unworkable in the university setting.
Instead, it decided that viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of
funding provided sufficient protection of students’ First Amendment
237
rights. As in the university setting, a court may determine that the
232. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d
624, 636 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that activities that the Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation funds are germane to the government’s interest in providing
legal services for the poor); Luban, supra note 4, at 234 (stating that the provision of
legal representation “should be regarded as a core function of the judicial system,
not a partisan political act”).
233. See, e.g., Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (stating that
plaintiffs objected to the use of IOLTA funds to finance representation for illegal
aliens); see also Luban, supra note 4, at 234 (quoting a Washington Legal Foundation
press release which states that “the use of the plaintiffs’ funds violates their First
Amendment rights by forcing them to finance ideological causes with which they
disagree”).
234. See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 51, at 2196-97 (discussing state-imposed
restrictions on the use of IOLTA funds in Texas and Washington).
235. See, e.g., TEX. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., RULES GOVERNING THE
OPERATION OF THE TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUNDATION 4 (stating that
IOLTA funds may not be used “to directly fund class action suits, lawsuits against
government entities, or lobbying for or against any candidate or issue”), available at
http://www.txiolta.org/about/docs/Rules_Govern_TEAJF_Amended_March_20_20
02.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review);
THE IOLA FUND OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, GRANTEES, at http://www.iola.org/
grantees.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (noting that grantees typically may not use IOLTA funds in fee-generating
cases or to contribute to a political party or candidate for office); IOWA JUDICIAL
BRANCH, LAWYER TRUST ACCOUNT COMMISSION, GRANT CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES, at
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/regs/grantcrit.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file
with the American University Law Review) (stating that Iowa IOLTA funds may not
be used to finance political campaigns, lobbying, or legislative activity).
236. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000) (explaining that it
is too unmanageable for the court to determine what speech is germane to a
university when the university seeks to promote the entire spectrum of speech).
237. See id. at 230 (holding that the exchange of ideas in a university setting is
analogous to a public forum where First Amendment rights are afforded heightened
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germane standard is unworkable in the IOLTA context because of
the difficulty in deciding what types of representation and topics of
238
If so,
litigation are germane to the mission of IOLTA programs.
IOLTA programs pass the viewpoint neutrality standard in their
distribution of funds.
There is no evidence that states make determinations about
allocations of IOLTA funding based on the viewpoints of the
recipients. States have established a local grant process that uses
239
viewpoint-neutral criteria for awarding grants.
For example,
Maryland disburses its IOLTA-generated funds according to the most
240
pressing needs identified in a state report. Texas awards its grants
on the basis of economic need within a geographic area, and it does
not allow grants to be used for activities already funded by another
241
entity.
As mentioned previously, recipients of IOLTA funds may
not use those funds to finance class action lawsuits, challenges to
242
government agencies, or political lobbying.
Applying both the germane standard and the viewpoint neutrality
standard, IOLTA programs do not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to promote the government’s important interest of
providing free legal services to the indigent. Even if a court views
IOLTA programs as content based, and therefore applies a strict
scrutiny analysis, a court should still uphold IOLTA programs’
constitutionality.
2.

Strict scrutiny
If a court views the provision of legal services in itself, or the
provision of legal services concerning certain issues, as ideological
protection).
238. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that in order to provide adequate
legal representation, a legal aid attorney must be able to raise all valid claims to
advocate zealously).
239. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (explaining the process through which
IOLTA funds are generated and distributed); see, e.g., MAINE BAR FOUNDATION GRANT
PROGRAM, GRANT PHILOSOPHY, at http://www.mbf.org/grants.htm#program%20
Information (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (providing that priority for 2001 grantees was given to those legal service
providers who effectively used technology to support their clients and who provided
services to rural populations).
240. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 45G (2002) (stating that no political test may be
used to identify grantees).
241. See TEX. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., supra note 235, at 3 (addressing
persons eligible to benefit from the grants and criteria for grants).
242. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text (providing examples of
limitations on how grantees may use IOLTA funds); see also Terence Doherty, The
Constitutionality of IOLTA Accounts, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 487, 521-24 (1998) (stating
that Texas rules prohibit the use of IOLTA funds for political lobbying or class
actions).
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243

activity, it may evaluate IOLTA using strict scrutiny. To pass a strict
scrutiny analysis, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
244
compelling government interest.
Past decisions indicate that IOLTA programs serve a compelling
state interest. For example, the Supreme Court in Brown, while
discussing the Fifth Amendment takings clause, referred to IOLTA’s
“overall, dramatic success . . . in serving the compelling interest in
245
providing legal services to literally millions of needy Americans.” In
246
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, the court implied that
“making legal services accessible to all citizens” is a compelling state
247
interest.
Recognition by the courts that IOLTA programs provide
services critical to the rule of law, coupled with the high percentage
of unmet legal needs among the poor, demonstrate that IOLTA
programs serve a compelling government interest.
Even accepting that the provision of legal services to the poor is a
compelling governmental interest, authors have argued that IOLTA
programs fail a strict scrutiny analysis because they are not narrowly
248
tailored to achieve their objective. They contend, for example, that
IOLTA programs could be funded through alternative means such as
249
tax revenues or increased bar dues. Others suggest that states with
mandatory IOLTA programs should replace them with voluntary or
opt-out programs so that attorneys can choose whether to place their
250
clients’ funds in an IOLTA account. Still another argument is that
attorneys should be required to obtain client consent before
251
depositing client funds into an IOLTA account.
None of these
243. See supra text accompanying notes 214-17 (discussing the treatment of IOLTA
programs as content based, thereby necessitating strict scrutiny).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14
(2000) (holding unconstitutional a provision of the Telecommunications Act that
required cable operators to scramble or limit the hours of sexually explicit channels
because the provision was not narrowly tailored to the compelling government
interest of preventing children from seeing sexually explicit images).
245. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1417 (2003).
246. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d
624 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
247. See id. at 636 n.6 (suggesting that, had the parties not abandoned such a
claim, the court would have held that the IOLTA program met a strict level of
scrutiny).
248. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 242, at 527 (suggesting that a legal services
program funded through taxes is less restrictive than an IOLTA program).
249. Id.; see also Darnell, supra note 4, at 807 (suggesting that states could impose
additional bar dues to finance legal services).
250. See Lantzer, supra note 33, at 1040 (arguing that voluntary and opt-out
IOLTA programs can achieve the same objective as mandatory programs and do not
violate First Amendment rights because they do not compel an attorney to
participate in the IOLTA program).
251. See Darnell, supra note 4, at 806-07 (proposing that Washington state retain
its mandatory IOLTA program but require clients to sign a consent form permitting
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proposed changes, however, accomplish the goals of IOLTA in a
manner less burdensome or restrictive to the client.
IOLTA programs are narrowly tailored to achieve the states’
interest in facilitating the provision of legal services. The district
court in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation recognized, “The
government’s interest in making legal services accessible would be
252
achieved less effectively absent the existence of IOLTA.”
IOLTA
programs are less restrictive than taxes or additional bar fees because
253
IOLTA programs do not use money that clients could ever access.
Further, it is illusory to believe that voluntary or opt-out programs
would be less restrictive on clients, because even in those programs it
is the attorney who decides whether to deposit funds in an IOLTA
254
account.
Also, requiring states to convert mandatory programs to
voluntary or opt-out ones would lead to a decrease in the amount of
255
interest generated by IOLTA. Further, requiring clients to consent
to IOLTA runs counter to the related IRS tax provision such that if a
client controls the placement of his funds in an IOLTA account, he
256
will have to pay tax on the interest formed.
Another proposed alternative to mandatory IOLTA programs is to
give clients the option to choose the litigation funded by their
257
money.
While such a scheme would give clients more First
deposit of their funds in an IOLTA account); Brent Salmons, IOLTAs: Good Work or
Good Riddance?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 271-73 (1998) (suggesting that IOLTA
programs should allow clients to choose the type of account in which their money
will be held, but noting the tax consequences of the change); Smith, supra note 61, at
1004-05 (suggesting that attorneys add a clause in their fee agreement regarding the
placement of certain client funds in IOLTA accounts).
252. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 636-37 n.6.
253. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1421 (2003) (stating that
clients’ pecuniary loss as a result of IOLTA programs is zero). Unlike IOLTA funds,
additional tax to fund legal services is money that a taxpayer could otherwise spend.
254. See Smith, supra note 61, at 1004 (noting that mandatory, opt-out, and
voluntary IOLTA programs, as they currently operate, presume that clients do not
need to approve the transferring of their interest on IOLTA accounts to the state
IOLTA program).
255. See Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d at 999 (explaining that Texas
changed its IOLTA program from voluntary to mandatory in 1989 because the
revenue yielded by the voluntary program was insufficient). After the state
implemented a mandatory IOLTA program, revenue increased from $1 million per
year to approximately $10 million per year. Id. See also Weissman, supra note 44, at
775 (predicting that efforts of IOLTA opponents to limit the use of funds will lead to
a drop in IOLTA funds).
256. See Salmons, supra note 251, at 271-73 (lobbying for Congress to amend the
tax code so that clients who control the disposition of their funds will not have to pay
tax on interest generated by those funds). But see J. David Breemer, IOLTA in the New
Millennium: Slowly Sinking Under the Weight of the Takings Clause, 23 HAWAII L. REV. 221
(2000) (arguing that a tax on interest would not seriously undermine an IOLTA
program that requires client consent).
257. Breemer, supra note 256, at 244-46 (proposing that IOLTA programs provide
a diverse choice of beneficiaries from which IOLTA depositors may choose the
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Amendment protection, it would likely be so inefficient and
258
In
expensive that it would make IOLTA programs ineffective.
Southworth, the Supreme Court stated that the University was free to
establish a system by which students could list those student groups
259
that they did and did not want to support.
However, the Court
declined to impose such a system on the University, explaining that it
could be “so disruptive and expensive” that the entire university
program of creating open dialogue through the funding of student
260
groups would be unsuccessful.
The Court stated, “The First
Amendment does not require the University to put the program at
261
risk.”
Similarly, states should not have to jeopardize the
effectiveness of their IOLTA programs by imposing an elective
system.
Moreover, allowing individual clients to withhold their funds from
litigation concerning issues they find objectionable runs counter to
the government’s interest in improving access to the justice system
262
for all.
If legal aid attorneys are prevented from raising an
otherwise valid claim because insufficient IOLTA funds are
designated for that issue, then they cannot provide adequate legal
263
representation. Justice Kennedy articulated such a sentiment in the
264
majority opinion of Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez. There, the
Court held that an LSC restriction banning challenges to welfare laws
265
violated the First Amendment.
The Court explained that such a

recipient of their interest); Risa I. Sackmary, IOLTA’s Last Obstacle: Washington
Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation’s Faulty Analysis of Attorneys’ First
Amendment Rights, 2 J.L. & POL’Y 187, 211 (1994) (suggesting that the state give
attorneys a “checklist of programs” from which they can choose the organizations
they wish to support).
258. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (stating that allowing clients to earmark
their funds for particular issues would require a tracking system and manpower that
IOLTA programs do not possess). IOLTA programs are run by volunteer board
members. Id.
259. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) (addressing
students’ claim that the University must give students the option to choose whether
to fund student groups with whose message they disagree).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (asserting that
attorneys ought to raise “all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary
for proper resolution of the case”).
263. See id. (stating that precluding the analysis of certain legal issues “prohibits
speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of
the judicial power”).
264. See id. at 533 (challenging the 1996 LSC restriction that prohibited recipients
of LSC funds from representing a client in a challenge to the validity of existing
welfare laws).
265. See id. at 537 (finding that the restriction constituted viewpoint-based
discrimination).
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restriction severely threatened judicial integrity because it prevented
attorneys from arguing otherwise legitimate claims and from raising
266
In
certain issues that might be relevant to a client’s case.
Southworth, the Court justified the invasion of students’ First
Amendment rights because of the University’s substantial interest in
267
maintaining an open forum for dialogue.
IOLTA-funded legal
service providers must be able to supply a diverse and open menu of
legal services, just as universities maintain an open forum for student
268
speech.
Clients who depend on IOLTA-funded attorneys are
unlikely to find alternative representation if an IOLTA-funded
269
attorney is limited in the issues in which he can represent his client.
States’ interest in improving access to the justice system and in
maintaining judicial integrity, as well as the absence of any less
restrictive alternative to IOLTA programs, justifies any impact on
clients’ First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
Inscribed over the entrance to the Supreme Court are the words
“Equal Justice Under the Law.” Former Supreme Court Justice Lewis
Powell, Jr. stated once that those words were “perhaps the most
270
inspiring ideal of our society.”
Still, the vast majority of poor
271
people’s legal needs remain unmet.
IOLTA programs alone will
not solve the problem of unmet legal needs, but in the wake of cuts
266. See id. at 546 (suggesting that the public would come to doubt the “adequacy
and fairness” of attorneys).
267. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000) (sustaining the
University’s program for funding student groups so long as it distributed funds using
a viewpoint neutral process).
268. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546 (ruling that restrictions preventing legal aid
attorneys from raising all valid claims during a suit compromises the fair
administration of justice).
269. See id. (stating that, if an indigent client may not retain the services of an LSC
attorney for welfare claims, he will likely have no source of information about his
rights).
270. See Laurence E. Norton II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REV.
601, 601 (1997) (quoting Justice Lewis Powell Jr. as stating, during his tenure as
president of the American Bar Association, that “[i]t is fundamental that justice
should be the same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic
status”).
271. See, e.g., Brief for AARP, supra note 57, at 11-12 (explaining that between
seventy and ninety percent of this country’s needy have unmet legal needs); Richard
C. Baldwin, Needs and Deeds, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2000, at 11 (finding that only
18.2% of low to moderate income Oregonians are able to obtain legal services when
they need them), available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/00dec/
feature.htm (on file with the American University Law Review); Cunningham, supra
note 57, at 58 (determining that the legal needs of the poor in Washington, D.C. are
substantially not met by comparing the estimated amount of legal need in
Washington, D.C. to that being met by pro bono work and law school clinics).
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and restrictions on federal funding for legal services, IOLTA funds
have become increasingly important in keeping existing legal service
272
providers in operation.
IOLTA programs are an intelligent and popular way for funding
273
legal services for the poor, as evidenced by the creation of IOLTA
274
It is
programs in every state and the District of Columbia.
important to remember that IOLTA programs do not take earnings
from clients that clients would otherwise have received, since client
funds deposited in IOLTA accounts are only those which could not
275
earn the client net interest. Rather, IOLTA programs transfer the
interest from banks to charitable organizations that provide legal
276
services for the poor.
Attacks on IOLTA programs, like attacks on the LSC, have largely
become battles along political lines and should not lead the Court to
277
view IOLTA programs as content based.
The provision of legal
services is not in itself a political or ideological activity, and a court
should treat IOLTA programs as content neutral. IOLTA programs
do not engage in lobbying or activities to support political candidates,
unlike the situations in Abood and Keller. As such, Justice Kennedy’s
implication that the same potential for First Amendment violations
exists in the IOLTA context as in Abood and Keller is mistaken. Even if
a court views IOLTA programs as content based, the programs survive
a strict scrutiny analysis; IOLTA programs support a compelling
government interest, and their impact on First Amendment rights is
278
no greater than necessary to achieve that interest.

272. See Houseman, supra note 42, at 1217 (discussing the rise in importance of
state funding for free legal services).
273. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1115 (2001)
(describing IOLTA programs’ rapid spread); Luban, supra note 4, at 227 (calling
IOLTA programs “ingenious”).
274. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1411 (2003) (noting
that, in most states, IOLTA programs were established by each state’s supreme
court); see also supra note 36 (listing IOLTA programs in existence in each state and
the District of Columbia).
275. See WHAT IS IOLTA?, supra note 4 (explaining that IOLTA programs use
funds generated from attorney-held accounts that traditionally did not generate
interest).
276. Id.
277. See Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public Service in
Illinois, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 7, 18-21 (1995) (explaining that the Reagan
administration changed LSC policies in order to inhibit the perceived left-wing
liberals who, the administration believed, controlled legal aid services); Christine A.
Klein, Beating a Dead Mouse: Do IOLTA Programs Create an Unconstitutional Taking of
Private Property?, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 1, 2-3 (noting that some view
IOLTA programs as part of a perceived liberal agenda).
278. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (applying strict scrutiny to IOLTA programs).
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For now, IOLTA programs continue to operate in all fifty states.
But, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Brown and the tenacity of the WLF
suggest that it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court
revisits the constitutionality of IOLTA programs.

